Unclassified Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions

 Iraq

Baghdad has refused since December 1998 to allow UN inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687 and subsequent Council resolutions, and no UN inspections have occurred during this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring systems installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq are not operating. Furthermore, Iraq has engaged in extensive concealment efforts and has probably used the period since it refused inspections to attempt to reconstitute prohibited programs. Without UN-mandated inspectors in Iraq, assessing the current state of Iraq's WMD and missile programs is difficult.

Saddam's repeated publicized exhortations to his "Nuclear Mujahidin" to "defeat the enemy" added to our concerns that since the Gulf war Iraq has continued Research and Development work associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. The Intelligence Community is concerned that Baghdad is attempting to acquire materials that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.

Iraq continues to develop short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) systems that are not prohibited by the United Nations and is expanding to longer-range systems. Pursuit of UN-permitted ballistic missiles allows Baghdad to improve technology and infrastructure that could be applied to a longer-range missile program. The appearance of four Al Samoud SRBM transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) with airframes at the 31 December 2000, Al Aqsa parade indicates that this liquid-propellant missile program is nearing deployment. Two new solid-propellant "mixing" buildings at the al-Mamoun plant—the site originally intended to produce Badr-2000 (that is Condor) solid-propellant missiles—appear especially suited to house large, UN-prohibited mixers of the type acquired for the Badr-2000 program.

In fact, we can find no logical explanation for the size and configuration of these mixing buildings other than an Iraqi intention to develop longer range, prohibited missiles (that is, to mix solid propellant exclusively geared for such missiles). In addition, Iraq has begun reconstructing the "cast and cure" building at al-Mamoun, which contains large and deep casting pits that were specifically designed to produce now-proscribed missile motors.

If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would increase its attempts to acquire missile-related items from foreign sources, regardless of any future UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on long-range ballistic missile programs. With substantial foreign assistance and an accommodating political environment, Baghdad could flight-test an MRBM by mid-decade. In addition, Iraq probably retains a small, covert force of Scud ballistic missiles, launchers, and conventional, chemical, and biological warheads. We assess that, since December 1998, Iraq has increased its capability to pursue chemical warfare (CW) programs.

After both the Gulf war and Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Iraq rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as former dual-use CW production facilities and missile production facilities. Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion of such equipment has increased. In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.

UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Iraqi Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions.

During this reporting period, Baghdad continued to pursue a BW program. Iraq in 1995 admitted to having an offensive BW program, but UNSCOM was unable to verify the full scope and nature of Iraq's efforts. UNSCOM assessed that Iraq was maintaining a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time. In addition, Iraq has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent R&D capabilities. In light of Iraq's growing industrial self-sufficiency and the likely availability of mobile or covert facilities, we are concerned that Iraq may again be producing BW agents.

Iraq is pursuing an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program that converts L‑29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. In the past, Iraq has conducted flights of the L-29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. We suspect that these refurbished trainer aircraft have been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.

Iraq aggressively continues to seek advanced conventional warfare (ACW) equipment and technology. A thriving gray arms market and porous borders have allowed Baghdad to acquire smaller arms and components for larger arms, such as spare parts for aircraft, air defense systems, and armored vehicles. Iraq also acquires some dual-use and production items that have applications in the ACW arena through the Oil-For-Food program.

North Korea

During this time frame, P'yongyang has continued attempts to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program. The North has been seeking centrifuge-related materials in large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program. It also obtained equipment suitable for use in uranium feed and withdrawal systems.

North Korea probably has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. Spent fuel rods canned in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework contain enough plutonium for several more weapons.

North Korea also has continued procurement of raw materials and components for its ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources, especially through North Korean firms based in China. North Korea continues to abide by its voluntary moratorium on flight tests, which it has said it would observe until at least 2003.

In April 2001, P'yongyang signed a Defense Industry and Military-Technical Cooperation Agreement with Russia, laying the groundwork for potential arms sales and transfers to North Korea. Weapons sales and deliveries will remain dependent on P'yongyang's ability to pay.